In 2024, Armenia and Azerbaijan have made substantial progress toward resolving their decades-long conflict, even as critical hurdles remain unresolved. Negotiations are currently divided into three main tracks: the peace agreement, border demarcation and connectivity. Each track has seen varying levels of success.

Peace agreement 

The first track focuses on peace agreement negotiations, which have been conducted bilaterally since October 2023. Remarkable progress has been made: while only 40% of the draft agreement was finalized by the end of 2023, this figure surged to 90% by December 2024. Over the past year, the foreign ministries of Armenia and Azerbaijan exchanged drafts in 15 rounds of text-based negotiations. 

Both sides confirm substantial progress. As of mid-December, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev confirmed that the two nations had reached an agreement on 15 of the 17 points in the draft peace agreement. In his recent interview, Aliyev stated that compromise was within reach. Similarly, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced earlier in the month that 90% of the text had been finalised. 

Even though the process has become fully bilateral, there were some attempts by third parties to facilitate Armenian-Azerbaijani meetings. For instance, the year began with a meeting between heads of state at the Munich Security Conference in February. Later in Berlin in April foreign ministers focused on technical issues like border delimitation and confidence-building measures. 

Later in the year, parallel to these European-led efforts, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken facilitated two rounds of talks between the foreign ministers in Washington in July and September. There they focused on legal claims and border security. In October, Michael Carpenter, a senior U.S. official and special assistant to President Joe Biden, visited both Armenia and Azerbaijan. During his visit, Carpenter carried a letter from President Biden, which urged both leaders to finalize a peace agreement by the end of the year. 

However, the bilateral format has proven the most effective. Western track could facilitate the discussion, but has been less impactful. 

Border demarcation 

The second track, managed by a bilateral border commission under the deputy prime ministers, is the most significant achievement of 2024 and probably in the history of the Armenia-Azerbaijan negotiations. 

On April 19 for the first time, Armenia and Azerbaijan reached a landmark agreement to restore a segment of their border. As part of this accord, Armenia returned four villages - Bağanıs Ayrım, Aşağı Əskipara, Xeyrımlı, and Qızılhacılı - to Azerbaijan in northwestern Qazax Province. The demarcation process began just days later, on April 23, with the installation of the first border posts. A month later, on May 24, 2024, Azerbaijan's State Border Guard Service assumed control of these villages, the State Border Guard Service of Azerbaijan took control of these four villages, which became an important step in the process of border normalisation. These villages, under Armenian control since 1992, had been deserted for decades after approximately 2,000 residents were displaced during the conflict. This region is unique, as it is one of the few areas – apart from enclaves – where both nations control settlements located within each other’s mainland territories. 

At the same time, a border regulation framework was established. For the first time in history, this agreement was ratified by the parliaments of both Armenia and Azerbaijan. It got full legal legitimacy in both countries. This was another big historical achievement.

Connectivity 

The third track focuses on connectivity and remains a trilateral involving Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia. While both Armenia and Azerbaijan have expressed a preference to exclude Russian involvement, unlike the first two tracks, which are fully institutionalized, this track lacks a formal bilateral structure. Here we can see that the parties have almost agreed. The only question remains whether to begin with passenger or commercial traffic, with commercial traffic being the more likely starting point. 

The most significant of the year`s meetings on this track probably was in Kazan, where President Aliyev and Prime Minister Pashinyan met on the sidelines of the 16th BRICS Summit in October. During this meeting, the leaders engaged in discussions on bilateral peace agenda, border delimitation and demarcation, as well as other matters of mutual concern. 

What remains? 

Yet, the lingering points of contention remain thorny. One unresolved issue involves a mutual commitment to refrain from filing international lawsuits against each other - a demand Aliyev characterized as negotiable. The other sticking point centres on a prohibition against deploying third-country representatives along the Armenia-Azerbaijan border (this might not only create a serious obstacle for the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process, but also lead to another crisis between Azerbaijan and the EU if the latter`s monitoring mission in Armenia receives prolongation in February 2025). 

Beyond these sticking points, the Azerbaijani side has additional demands. The first one is the amendment of Armenia's Constitution, which currently references the Declaration of Independence, which asserts territorial claims to Azerbaijan’s former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region. Baku also seeks Armenia’s agreement to dissolve the OSCE Minsk Group, a body long tasked with mediating the conflict, since its dissolution requires a consensus. Azerbaijan’s insistence here stems from its perception that the group is no longer relevant to the post-2020 realities because the Second Karabakh War has resolved many of the issues that the Minsk Group was supposed to address. Among the group’s mandates was the question of the status of Karabakh - the issue which no longer exists. Baku maintains that any further discussions about autonomy or special status for Karabakh are incompatible with Azerbaijan’s constitution. 

With the failure of OSCE, Western and Russian mediation to yield progress in peace negotiations, the focus has shifted toward a bilateral format. For Azerbaijan, this approach is seen as a means to sideline external actors it views as either ineffective or biased. Baku believes fewer stakeholders make agreements more practical and implementable. 

Meanwhile, we can see a significant shift in Armenia’s narrative. In his Facebook post on December 23, Nikol Pashinyan acknowledged a critical error in his handling of Karabakh's fate. Pashinyan admitted that the core objective of decades-long negotiations since 1994 was always the return of Karabakh to Azerbaijan - a fact he had previously failed to fully accept. Pashinyan confessed that his sense of patriotism had clouded his judgment in 2018 when he was first exposed to the realities of the negotiations. He explained that, driven by a desire to protect national pride, he had not shared these uncomfortable truths with the Armenian people. 

Now, considering that 90% of the draft peace deal has been agreed upon, can this be considered a success? Is this progress or not? If we look at the remaining points of disagreement, they are largely technical and should be resolvable. But why is this all happening? The answer lies in the institutional suspicion and mistrust between the parties, which continue to hinder progress. Both sides view the opponent as a potential cheater and fear that the other will not follow their commitments. 

Looking ahead to 2025, the developments will highly depend on two critical factors. First, the U.S. approach could shift significantly depending on the outcome of the 2024 presidential election, with Trump’s return to office likely to influence the dynamics of American involvement. Second, the ongoing war in Ukraine remains a wildcard with its possible effects to reshape the trajectory of Armenia-Azerbaijan negotiations. All in all, despite the challenges, Armenia and Azerbaijan are closer to peace than ever.