I. Agenda of Russian-Armenian Relations

On May 20, 2025, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov arrived in Yerevan on a two-day working visit. On May 21, 2025, he held meetings with senior Armenian officials. In the morning, the Russian diplomat met with Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan, and in the afternoon - with Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and President Vahagn Khachaturyan. (1)

Having signed the consultation program for 2025-2026 between the diplomatic departments of the two countries (2), the heads of the foreign ministries gave a joint press conference. A. Mirzoyan spoke about Armenia's regional initiatives, emphasizing the unrealized "full economic potential of the South Caucasus" and called for unblocking transport routes to stimulate trade. To this end, the Armenian diplomat once again presented the "Crossroads of the World" project as a plan to restore infrastructure links and ensure the common prosperity of the countries of the region (3).

Mirzoyan also downplayed the importance of rapprochement with the West, telling journalists that "Armenia has not applied for membership in the European Union, and no negotiations are underway on this topic" (4). In turn, S. Lavrov emphasized the long-standing partnership between the countries, highly appreciating the "implementation of agreements at the highest level" in the field of trade and security, noting the achievement of a trade turnover of $12 billion dollars (5). The Russian minister also announced that Russia plans to open a consulate general in Kapan to deepen ties with the southern provinces of Armenia. (6) Regarding the “Crossroads of Peace” project, S. Lavrov agreed that in order to implement this project, Baku and Yerevan must first sign a peace agreement. (7)

In response to the aggressive attacks of an Armenian journalist regarding the finished conflict in “Nagorno-Karabakh”, the Russian minister actually confirmed the existence of the (unimplemented) Kremlin plan to postpone the final solution to the issue for future generations (8).

II. Military-technical cooperation

Regarding security issues, Russia’s support for Armenia within the framework of its active participation in the CSTO activities was noted, as well as the 30-year operation of the Russian 102nd military base in Gyumri as the “cornerstone” of the security of the Caucasian country (9). The minister hinted that the Kremlin had proposed a CSTO observer mission after Azerbaijani- Armenian borderline clashes in 2022, but that Armenia had rejected it in favor of an EU civilian mission. (10) Lavrov also touched upon the issue of arms purchases, acknowledging that Russia is having difficulty fulfilling old contracts due to the war in Ukraine and therefore "will not object to Yerevan purchasing weapons from third parties." However, the diplomat warned that buying weapons from countries "openly hostile to Russia" (France) raises questions about Armenia's strategic course. (11)

At noon on the same day, Sergey Lavrov was received by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. In his opening speech, the Armenian prime minister spoke about the "current state of Armenian-Russian relations," and Lavrov thanked him and emphasized Russia's readiness to "develop relations with Armenia." According to the official communiqué, the politicians discussed the bilateral agenda, cooperation within the Eurasian Economic Union and regional security issues. (12) Later, at a meeting with teachers and students of the Russian-Armenian University, the Russian diplomat said that the West was trying to prevent the consolidation of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia with their neighbors, in fact focusing on the importance of the concept of regionalism in the South Caucasus. (13)

On the day of S. Lavrov's arrival in Armenia, activists from the pro-Western party "For the Republic" staged a short protest in Yerevan, hanging large banners with the inscription "Murderer" addressed to Russian President Vladimir Putin on a bridge and near the Russian embassy. Within a few hours, the Armenian police removed the banners, and Armenian officials later distanced themselves from the action.(14) The incident immediately drew condemnation in Moscow. A senior official in the Russian State Duma, Alexei Chepa, called the poster a “provocation” and called on Yerevan to punish the protesters “in the most severe form.” (15)

III. Robert Kocharyan’s Long Interview

On May 19, 2025, about a day before Lavrov’s arrival in Yerevan, former Armenian President Robert Kocharyan gave a lengthy interview to local media, in which he warned that Yerevan’s current foreign policy “risks losing everything.” He called on the Armenian authorities to “stay away from the EU” due to the political-economic community’s inability to resolve Armenia’s security issues, and instead to restore “strategic partnership with Russia.”

Kocharyan added that Iran should also be part of this future alliance and further accused Pashinyan of conducting a propaganda campaign aimed at “sowing mistrust towards Russia.” 

On May 24, 2025, the Hraparak newspaper, known for its closeness to government circles and insider information, published news about R. Kocharyan’s two-day visit to Moscow, where a Kremlin official studying the domestic political situation in Armenia advised him to “show restraint” in the matter of Pashinyan’s impeachment.(16) The newspaper also added that Russia has recently increased its interest in Armenia’s domestic politics, and the Kremlin’s new curator for “Armenian issues,” Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation Sergei Kiriyenko, is already studying the situation there. (17)

On May 23, 2025, the Anti-Corruption Committee of Armenia announced the official filing of charges against the third president, Serzh Sargsyan. The third president was accused of accepting bribes worth about $2.985 million in 2008 in exchange for using his official position to facilitate a business deal. Prosecutors said the case was closed and would go to trial. Sargsyan himself denies his guilt, and his legal team promises to challenge the charges. (18)

As for disagreements with R. Kocharyan, S. Sargsyan noted in his statements that he would not be against Kocharyan's candidacy for the post of prime minister in the event of an impeachment. (19)

IV. Bagrat Galstanyan's plans

On May 25, 2025, in an interview with local media, the leader of the Tavush - for the Motherland movement, Archbishop and head of the Tavush Diocese of the Armenian Apostolic Church (AAC) Bagrat Galstanyan (Srbazan) said that he had been preparing people for street fighting for 3-4 months and that by 2026 the elections should be held without the participation of the Civil Contract. (20) It is noteworthy that on May 15, 2025, the cleric announced a meeting with representatives of all political forces in Armenia, adding that meetings had already been held with representatives of the Country for Life party, the Hayakve civil initiative, political scientist Suren Surenyants, as well as with representatives of the Yazidi community. (21) On May 27, 2025, Garnik Danielyan, an MP from the Armenia party, noted in a statement to journalists that Bagrat Galstanyan would announce further steps and large-scale protests in the coming days. (22)

Against this background, it is worth considering the continued decline in Nikol Pashinyan's rating. Thus, according to a survey by the Caucasus Research Resource Center (CRRC), 15% of participants trust Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and the Civil Contract party he leads. At the same time, the ratings of former presidents, such as R. Kocharyan and S. Sargsyan, are also low- 2% and 4%, respectively; and 55% of respondents did not choose any political force at all. (23)

Conclusions and expectations

Lavrov's visit to Armenia should first of all be assessed in the context of "synchronizing watches" and clarifying positions in bilateral relations between Russia and Armenia. The results of the visit once again confirm the thesis from the September material (24) about the policy of balancing Armenia, but not the anti-Russian agenda of the foreign policy line of the Pashinyan government. The whole point is that in the context of the political-economic and historical realities of Armenian statehood in the South Caucasus, any step of diversification on the part of the current Armenian leadership is mistakenly assessed as “distancing from Russia”, “anti-Russian rhetoric”, although in the real state of affairs it is nothing more than diversification of the domestic and foreign policy field, where Russia has historically had the strongest leverage over Armenia.

In addition, at least 3 factors speak in favor of the thesis of diversification, and not the “anti-Russian policy” of the Pashinyan government: 1) the 102nd base of the Russian Armed Forces in Gyumri; 2) Being in pro-Russian military-economic unions (in the case of the CSTO - de jure; in the case of the EAEU - de jure and de facto); 3) Strong economic dependence on Russia. Against the background of the above, it is also worth noting the acquisition of "political maturity" and pragmatism by Pashinyan's team, which has been in power for 7 years. The events of recent years clearly show that the Armenian Prime Minister takes into account the geopolitical realities of not only the South Caucasus, but also the World, trying to act in a neutral manner, balancing between the West and Russia.

As for Russia's position, the activation of Kocharyan, who is considered a strong candidate by the majority of pro-Russian political groups, as well as reports of increased interest from Russian government officials in relation to Armenia may indicate that despite satisfaction with the results of Lavrov's visit, the Kremlin still holds a "backup card" in case of emergency.

It should not be overlooked that Moscow still has a more active card in the person of the representative of the AAC, Bagrat Galstanyan, who seems to promise impressive demonstrations against the authorities. However, the success of such “march” is highly questionable due to both Srbazan’s lack of political experience and the lack of novelty in the methods of struggle- it is doubtful that the cleric will be able to defeat Pashinyan by the power of the “street”.

And what is also important is whether it is in Moscow’s interests to “remove” Pashinyan in the current period, if the Armenian authorities are in fact cautious and more or less predictable for the Kremlin. Nevertheless, Russia’s intentions to open a consulate general in Kafan once again emphasize its interest and desire to control the route passing through the territory of Armenia (with the help of the Russian FSB). Moreover, like Iran, Russia also emphasizes the importance of the concept of regionalism in the context of cooperation in the “3+3” format.