Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and rising geopolitical tensions across the globe highlight the need for alternative trade routes less reliant on transit through Russia. The Trans-Caspian International Transport Corridor (TITR), also known as the Middle Corridor, which connects China with the EU, passing through Central Asia and the South Caucasus, has gained renewed focus as a viable alternative to the Northern Corridor. However Japan’s attention towards the Middle Corridor started way earlier, it was somewhat inconsistent over time. It was primarily driven by Tokyo’s aims to diversify trade routes and counterbalance Russia’s and China's regional influence. While Japan joined the global rush to strengthen ties with Central Asia following the Ukraine war, domestic priorities have at times overshadowed these efforts.

Japan's Early Engagement with CASC

Japan was among the first countries to recognize the nations of Central Asia and the South Caucasus (CASC) but it was relatively slow in establishing deep bilateral ties. Japanese policymakers initially viewed the CASC region as part Russia's sphere of influence and, therefore, not a primary focus of Japan. The early 1990s brought significant political instability to the area as Armenia and Azerbaijan clashed over the Nagorno-Karabakh region and Abkhazia and South Ossetia attempted to secede from Georgia. At the same time, infrastructure in the CASC region was underdeveloped, making it safer and more efficient to use the Trans-Siberian railway. Moreover, Japan was keen to maintain positive relations in the early 1990s with Russia to address the Northern Territories dispute.

Japan’s interest in the CASC region took a new turn in 1997 when former prime minister Ryutaro Hashimoto pushed forward the concept of ‘Eurasian diplomacy’ to develop relations with Russia, China, and the CASC region. The initiative mainly focused on economic, cultural, educational, and human resources spheres. Tokyo used its traditional foreign policy tool, “checkbook diplomacy” - economic aid in the form of official development assistance - in return for closer bilateral ties. By 2000, Japan expressed an interest in the CASC, primarily focusing on Central Asia. Tokyo launched the “Silk Road” initiative and actively promoted it across the region. The primary goal was to avoid having China and Russia monopolize the region’s energy resources. Though Japan did not directly import energy from Central Asia, it viewed the region as a potential source of reliable supplies in the case of disruptions in the Middle East. The “Central Asia Plus Japan” platform was also established to foster peace and stability. This framework occasionally brought together Japanese and Central Asian foreign ministers to discuss key issues.

The Shift to the Caucasus

Until the late 2010’s, the Caucasus was not a priority region for Japan. Starting in 2018, the Japanese government formulated “The Caucasus Initiative” to build deeper economic cooperation with countries in South Caucasus by investing in the corridor connecting The Caspian Sea and the Black Sea. Georgia and Azerbaijan became the initiative's key focus because of their pivotal location between Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. The initiative had two pillars: assistance for human resources development and paving the way for the business environment, and infrastructure developments to reach the “Appealing Caucasus” at the end. During the visit of Taro Kono, Former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan to the Caucasus, Japan agreed to invest in several key projects, including “the East-West Highway Improvement Project (Phase 2)” in Georgia and the “Shimal Gas Combined Cycle Power Plant” in Azerbaijan.

From 2019 to 2022, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan emerged as top recipients of Japanese investments among CASC countries. This reflects the increasing strategic importance of Azerbaijan in the South Caucasus and Uzbekistan in Central Asia within the Middle Corridor.

Renewed Interest and Challenges

After 2022, the strategic importance of the South Caucasus has increased for different power centers, including Japan. The Ukraine war shifted the transport realities in the region, putting the spotlight on the trade routes that bypass Russian territory. USA, China, and the EU (and some of its member states) have organized high-level summits with regional leaders, aiming to forge new deals to get access to the region’s increasingly important strategic raw materials and sustainable trade corridors to boost cooperation. Against this background, Japan may not want to miss the opportunity to expand its regional footprint. To contribute to the Middle Corridor, Japan organized the 12th "Central Asia Plus Japan"  dialogue in Tokyo, focusing on improving connectivity between Central Asia and the Caucasus. The conference brought together experts and government officials from five Central Asian countries, Georgia and Azerbaijan. This dialogue emphasized facilitating logistics and Japan's involvement in utilizing the TITR, which is critical for strengthening regional ties. However, following the dialogue, the Japanese side is yet to show the seriousness of its commitment to securing the proposed goals. 

While regional leaders actively engaged with global powers, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida also scheduled a visit to Central Asia to mark the 20th anniversary of the "Central Asia Plus Japan" framework in August 2024. This summit would be remarkable in terms of pioneering new Central Asian diplomacy and strengthening Japan’s role in the Middle Corridor. Furthermore, the planned summit in Astana was expected to gather big Japanese corporations which would help attract significant investment to Central Asian economies. Summit was notable for one reason: Fumio Kishida would be the third Japanese prime minister to visit Central Asia after Abe’s visit in 2015, and it could be the first attempt to further bilateral transactions after the Ukrainian war. It was considered “New Japan’s pivot to Central Asia”, shaping a new diplomatic approach to the region. However, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida canceled the trip due to the risk of the Nankai Trough earthquake, raising concerns about Japan's diplomatic momentum. While an official framed the summit as postponed rather than canceled, the absence of a rescheduled date leaves its future in question.

On the other side, China, Japan’s strategic rival, has been increasing its involvement in the Middle Corridor. Central Asia and the Caucasus are becoming a new transit hub for China’s railroad connection to Europe. In June, a Chinese company secured a share in a deep-sea port project in Georgia, raising concerns about Beijing’s growing influence in the wider Black Sea basin. Meanwhile, in September, China Railway Container Transport (CRTC) officially announced its intention to join the Middle Corridor joint venture, a company established by Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Kazakhstan in 2023 to provide smooth transfer of cargo along the route. This marked China’s formal endorsement of the Middle Corridor, demonstrating its serious commitment to the initiative.

In this context, Japan's weaker engagement with the project could pose a significant challenge to its position in the region. This is particularly concerning if tensions in Taiwan disrupt the maritime routes, destabilizing Japan’s connections with the Arabian Peninsula and Europe. Such a scenario would highlight the importance of alternative routes like the Middle Corridor, where Japan risks falling behind China in influence and connectivity.

Domestic Priorities Overshadow Diplomacy

Following the September 2024 prime ministerial election, Japan's newly elected Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba announced a shift in the government’s priorities. In his inaugural speech to the Diet, Ishiba emphasized strengthening the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and enhancing Japan’s defense capabilities in response to escalating threats from North Korea and China. With defense issues dominating the government’s agenda, it seems it has become increasingly challenging for Japan to prioritize overseas trade and infrastructure projects, including its involvement in the Middle Corridor. Nevertheless, there remains potential for collaboration between Japan and CASC countries, particularly, in areas such as trade, sustainable energy, and technology in the future.