The 26 October Parliamentary elections in Georgia, quite as expected, turned out to be very divisive and controversial. While the voting outcome of the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) was officially declared at the level of 53.9%, the opposition parties refused to recognise it, accusing the government of launching a large-scale fraud and intimidation campaign which they claim had fundamentally skewed the results. Even exit polls on election day reported a wildly diverse range of outcomes, from 40% to 56% for GD. Few foreign countries have so far congratulated the ruling party with the victory, while the opposition block convened a few protest rallies in Tbilisi starting from 28 October. 

This political disarray happens amid the slow-burning political crisis triggered by some governmental decisions, particularly the lasting controversy around the so-called “foreign agent law”, rising tensions between Tbilisi and the West, despite the EU’s decision to accept Georgia as a candidate country in 2023, and recent crackdown on the opposition. All these factors have earned GD an image of a pro-Russian party from which it had been trying to distance itself for many years, and some observers even started to claim that Georgia is quickly shifting towards Moscow’s zone of influence. These tensions are further polarising political discourse in the country, as the government, inspired by the informal GD leader Bidzina Ivanishvili, blames some “Western circles” in trying to open a new frontline in the Caucasus and push Georgia into a war with Russia, and insists that Georgian opposition is complicit in this sinister goal. On the other hand, the opposition has come to view the ruling party not only as a political rival but as Russian puppets and enemies of democracy.

For all these reasons, the future of Georgia for now seems to be unclear. Further direction of the country will be likely contingent on a few factors, including whether the electoral outcomes will be eventually recognised by the West, the degree and scale of ensuing political confrontation, and whether the government will be able to convene an effective Parliament (it is not clear so far) or it will be forced to call new elections. Three major scenarios, which we briefly sketch below, can be considered given the interplay of these major factors.

“Serbia”: a country with stably balanced foreign policy (status quo scenario)

If the protests don’t yield any significant outcome and end relatively quickly, while parliament is duly convened (in case all the opposition parties join the boycott of the parliament, GD will fall short of the 100-seat threshold necessary for doing so) then the government won’t have to enter a further round of confrontation with the civil society, exacerbating the ongoing crisis with the West. In this scenario, opposition parties unwillingly accept this status quo as a long-term reality. Western pressure on Georgia to take a more anti-Russian stance is relieved, existing institutional cooperation with the EU remains on the same level but accession talks get effectively frozen (however, we can also suggest that the ruling elite is ready for bargaining, for example repealing or amending the foreign agent law, abstain from banning major opposition parties or reduce participation in Russian sanction evasion mechanisms in exchange of unambiguous recognition and acquiescence on behalf of the West). Tbilisi probably enters more institutional arrangements with non-Western actors, such as China, India etc. Its relationship with the West will also depend on the outcome of the US presidential elections, and in case of Trump’s victory there will be little incentive to pay lip service to Western integration rhetoric, particularly if expectations that his administration won’t be interested in challenging Russia in this part of the world, hold true.  

This scenario will also become much more probable should the talks about potential reunification with Abkhazia and Ossetia prove futile. It also depends on the further developments in the war in Ukraine- Georgia will definitely avoid unambiguous rapprochement with Moscow if the latter doesn’t achieve its military goals, either making compromises or getting trapped in a prolonged war. In a nutshell, Georgia’s standing in the region stabilises as somewhat resembling Serbia- the country which prefers to stay neutral and holds an intricate balance between various centres of power, refuses to accept all Western standards but at the same time remains within the broad Western normative framework.

For the South Caucasus, this scenario guarantees the status quo for the key geopolitical interests of the regional players: Georgia’s role as a crucial transit country between Azerbaijan and Türkiye, the gateway to the Central Asia for Europe, as well as its neutrality in the Russian—Ukrainian conflict, will preserve. China’s interest in the country’s market will probably continue to grow and spill over into general interest in the region as a whole as Beijing prioritises strategic relations with stable and predictable actors. It should play a positive role for the prospects of the Azerbaijani-Armenian normalisation, since the GD government in its current shape seems eager to avoid strong alignments and thus no additional opportunities for outside actors to use Georgia to increase their leverage in the region, unlike the other two scenarios, will emerge. In the long term, this scenario will normalise the idea that a country can remain in the Western sphere of influence without accepting all its standards and diversifying interests, which will have a lasting impact on the international strategy of Western actors, particularly the EU, in general.

“Belarus”: a consolidated anti-Western bastion

If a larger political confrontation emerges as a result of a parliamentary boycott and the government decides to quell it by force, ban opposition parties and take other repressive measures, Ivanishvili will call the protesters “foreign agents”, most probably blaming the West for instigating them. Georgian leadership will get sanctioned and most cooperation formats with the EU and Western institutions are discontinued. Russian influence in the country grows, Tbilisi in the best case manages to balance it with Turkish, Chinese etc. influence, in the worst scenario it becomes a quasi-satellite for Moscow, especially if the latter decides to reward it with the return of the currently occupied territories. In a way, Georgia turns into a second Belarus though on much worse conditions since it lacks the economic and military resources and a direct border with the EU that enables Lukashenko to somewhat preserve his independence from the Kremlin.

In the medium term, this scenario may dramatically change the regional geopolitics as control over Tbilisi will enable Moscow to exert much stronger influence over the whole South Caucasus, especially if Azerbaijan and Armenia don’t achieve comprehensive reconciliation with the establishment of communications, diplomatic relations etc. Russian hegemony in Georgia will also significantly undermine Turkish leverage in the region, and hence Ankara will either have to accept it or fully align its position with the NATO mainstream, confronting Moscow. In any case, plans for the expansion of the Turkic countries’ cooperation within the OTS will suffer a serious blow. Also, if Moscow manages to restore hegemony over Georgia, it may further discredit the EU’s reputation as a geopolitical power among non-Western actors, pushing them to take a more aggressive stance and play zero-sum games, thoroughly restricting the smaller states’ freedom of action on the international arena.

“Ukraine”: destabilization and turmoil

Opposition organizes its “Maidan” supported by the West, and succeeds in securing re-election or even directly pushing the government down. The new opposition government comes to power in a severely divided country as the GD-affiliated elite is worried about its future and tries to secure its influence and assets. The government promises to push ahead with European integration plans, while GD, nationalists and Russian-related groups call it a challenge to the Georgian identity and threaten a war. Moscow will consider either launching a full-scale invasion (more likely if by that time there is a ceasefire in Ukraine) or at least running a series of destabilising acts on the perimeters of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to cause significant socioeconomic harm- especially in case it further succeeds in Ukraine or holds active ceasefire talks. While the West is incapable of mounting efficient support, the only deterrent factor for Russia will be its relations with Türkiye, but given that they have been somewhat deteriorating since 2023, it might not always work. Georgia’s political and economic stability will be cast into question. Or in the opposite case, if Moscow finds another military adventure too costly and unnecessary, there is a likelihood that a pro-European Georgian government will scale down its relationship with Baku, giving in to the “democracy vs authoritarianism” rhetoric, which will in turn also diminish Yerevan’s incentives to agree on Azerbaijan’s peace treaty project and 

This scenario will bring tremendous polarisation to the region, and add even more risks to the already very fragile balance. Pressure on other currently neutral post-Soviet countries will rise from both sides, and especially from Moscow which will probably be tempted to rely on force even more. Economic climate will deteriorate, and large Europe- or China-supported infrastructure projects may have to be abandoned. The chances for a stably and securely pro-Western Georgia (we may call it “Saakashvili 2.0”) currently look rather low as they require a dramatic turn of events in Ukraine which will prompt Russia to scale down its ambitions, as well as a coherent and organised campaign by the opposition.