In January 2026, Venezuela entered an unprecedented phase of political uncertainty and potential transition following dramatic developments that have reshaped both domestic and international dynamics. After the capture of Nicolás Maduro in January and the installation of an interim government under Delcy Rodríguez, debates over the future of power structures, the role of the military, the viability of democratic processes, and the influence of external actors have intensified. Amid ongoing economic challenges, contested legitimacy, and international pressures, questions about the configuration of real power in the country and the prospects for meaningful change remain at the forefront of regional and global discussion. We discussed these developments with Xavier Rodríguez Franco, a political scientist specialized in Latin American politics.

Which actors currently concentrate real power in Venezuela, and how is the balance between civil, military, and political institutions being reconfigured?

The military component remains fundamental to understanding Chavismo. It has been so for decades, although after January 3 its prestige has been damaged both inside and outside Venezuela. For many years, a strong narrative was built around Venezuela’s military power, with support from China, Russia, and Iran. This factor was crucial, although after recent events it is no longer as influential as it once was.

For years, the Armed Forces professionalized internal repression, aiming to prevent protests and persecute the opposition. A repressive apparatus was consolidated with support from Cuban intelligence. As a result, armed forces originally designed for national defense were transformed, as in Iran and Russia, into an instrument of internal control at the service of Chavismo.

At present, military power remains linked to criminal networks, with figures such as Diosdado Cabello and Vladimir Padrino López. This is a diffuse and opaque form of control, lacking transparency, based on collaboration with criminal and paramilitary groups that control parts of the territory. These include illegal mining networks in the Amazon, the ELN guerrilla group, smuggling of natural resources, and drug trafficking. The official Armed Forces have supported these illegal groups, which has also generated revenue for the government, although this system has been internationally sanctioned.

This is an authoritarian regime with an extremely high level of repression, making it difficult to accurately assess the resources it controls. This network is known as the Cartel de los Soles, and these activities are estimated to represent between 25 and 30 percent of Venezuela’s annual revenues in recent years.

Does Delcy Rodríguez have real possibilities to influence or lead the country in this transitional phase?

There is currently talk of a transition, with institutions such as the National Assembly, the justice system, and other public bodies operating under Delcy Rodríguez’s authority. At first glance, a transition seems possible, but any power group remains vulnerable to pressure or attacks from the United States, including in the Caribbean.

For now, Delcy Rodríguez’s role is essentially about survival. She controls the country’s political and economic dynamics, but she does not have real autonomy. Her main function is to contain the most radical and extreme factions within the government, rather than exercising independent leadership like Chávez or Maduro did in their time.

What role are the Armed Forces playing in the current context, and how decisive is their positioning for the country’s political future?

Today, the Armed Forces mainly perform policing functions. In the past, they were financed through the oil sector, which is now sanctioned, and through illegal economies such as gold smuggling, kidnappings, human trafficking, and drug trafficking. There have been many years of indoctrination, teaching a single ideological vision, namely the revolutionary one.

This raises concerns about whether a rebellious group similar to the original Chavismo could emerge and attempt a coup. For this reason, it is important that the Armed Forces receive some form of amnesty and are included in the new political scenario. Although they are involved in human rights violations and will be important in the future, they currently do not have real political influence.

Is the Venezuelan opposition in a position to effectively influence internal processes?

The opposition cannot influence internal processes, neither from within the country nor from abroad. It is fragmented and excluded from political arrangements. There is no freedom of the press, and the government lacks transparency. Until a democratic transition takes place, the opposition cannot exert real influence.

Those living abroad have greater visibility, but inside Venezuela the opposition cannot meet freely. The release of political prisoners has been slow and poorly organized, reaching only about 20 percent. Many have died at the hands of the state, while others are in very poor health conditions.

The opposition decides absolutely nothing about what happens in Venezuela and acts merely as a spectator. The case of María Corina Machado clearly illustrates this. Although she met with figures such as Marco Rubio and Donald Trump, these meetings were distant and reflect the awareness that she currently has no real influence. In a future scenario with democratic dynamics, she might participate in elections, but not for now.

What narratives currently dominate within Venezuela about the country’s political future?

Fear predominates. There is a strict and hegemonic communicational control exercised by the government. Despite limited internet access and the existence of some radio stations not directly controlled by the regime, there is widespread fear about the future. There is some relief at the departure of a despot like Maduro, but there is no clarity about what comes next.

The diaspora is aware that the power structure remains intact and that the entire state apparatus continues to function. There is deep uncertainty. Although Delcy Rodríguez is president, she does not represent a guarantee of freedom of expression. The Armed Forces remain present in the streets. Recently, military personnel who no longer receive state payments as before have harassed small independent business owners, checking phones and threatening imprisonment in order to get some bribe from them, especially in urban areas.

What is clear is that a new phase has begun. Business with the United States is resuming, the economy is being reactivated, and while some sectors call for Maduro’s return, the government is attempting to move forward with these changes. This amounts to a moderate revolution. The United States has gone from being portrayed as the enemy of the homeland under Chavismo to becoming a petroleum partner, a contradiction driven by regime survival.

How viable is the holding of credible and competitive elections?

For now, elections are an obligation and an expectation toward which efforts are being directed. It is not feasible for them to take place within one or two months, as political prisoners remain and democratic freedoms do not exist. Nevertheless, elections are a clear demand from both society and the international community.

Looking ahead, is Venezuela moving toward a genuine democratic transition or toward a hybrid system?

It is difficult to determine. A change is underway, but it is unclear whether it will lead to a genuine democracy or to a hybrid regime with limited reforms. What does seem clear is that there will not be a return to the authoritarian model characteristic of classic Chavismo. Chavismo as it once existed will not return. Transitions do not always lead to full democracies; sometimes they result in imperfect systems involving elite turnover. The first elections will be decisive.

What objectives are the United States currently pursuing in Venezuela?

Beyond oil and political considerations, the main objective of the United States is to reduce Russian, Chinese, and Iranian influence in Venezuela. It seeks to displace external actors that supported an authoritarian regime hostile to democracy, the region, and the United States itself.

Oil is a necessary condition for economic reactivation. The United States is currently at its highest level of control and extraction of these resources, and the goal is not to strip the country of its oil but to use it to finance Venezuela’s reconstruction. Additionally, democratizing Venezuela could have regional spillover effects, influencing countries such as Nicaragua and Cuba, as well as electoral dynamics in Colombia and Brazil. This aligns with the 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy.

How realistic is U.S. involvement in Venezuela’s energy sector?

U.S. involvement in Venezuela’s oil sector has been historical. It is not new. The first major wave of Venezuelan migration to the United States was linked to the oil sector, particularly to the Houston area. The United States has a deep understanding of Venezuela’s political and economic geography and knows how to leverage opportunities in oil and gas.

It also has refineries that have adapted over the years to Venezuelan crude. Under Chavismo, the biggest problem was the destruction of infrastructure and the lack of maintenance. The United States is the actor best positioned, in terms of resources and expertise, to implement large-scale reactivation plans, more so than Russia or Iran.

How are Russia and China reacting to recent changes in Venezuela?

The relationship with Russia was primarily military. Some of the military equipment did not function properly, partly because it was not fully paid for and partly because it was not suited to modern warfare scenarios involving drones. Between 15 and 20 percent of the equipment remains unpaid, along with its maintenance costs. Sukhoi aircraft are not operational due to a lack of spare parts. To avoid damaging the prestige of its military industry, the Kremlin adopted a defensive stance.

China, by contrast, reacted in a more diplomatic manner and expressed support for Delcy Rodríguez’s new government, while reminding Venezuela that outstanding debts still need to be paid. Neither Russia nor China is expected to become actively involved in reviving the revolution. Given the current U.S. military deployment in the Caribbean, their room for maneuver is limited. China is now assisting Cuba with rice and oil, while some Russian ships were stopped by the United States.

How are Latin American countries positioning themselves in response to Venezuela’s situation?

Regional politics largely depend on electoral dynamics. Countries such as Costa Rica, Colombia, Brazil, and Haiti are holding elections this year. Colombia and Brazil’s current leaderships are not aligned with the United States, but after recent events it is clear they lack the power to reverse what happened in Venezuela. They criticize the manner in which events unfolded but focus primarily on their own electoral campaigns, as both Petro and Lula face domestic political risks of not being reelected.

Chile and Argentina support Venezuela’s democratic reconstruction, but without concrete initiatives beyond official statements. Along with Paraguay and Peru, they could form an important support bloc. Diplomatic opposition could come from Mexico, but it is unlikely to go beyond democratic rhetoric due to Mexico’s relationship with the United States. Cuba and Nicaragua remain the main allies of the former Bolivarian project. Uruguay expressed criticism but took no further action. The regional support that once existed through oil shipments from Venezuela to regional countries no longer exists, except in the cases of Cuba, Nicaragua, and some European intellectual circles.

What impact could this evolution have on Venezuela’s historical relationship with Cuba?

This relationship is already changing. On January 3, the direct involvement of the Cuban government in Venezuela became evident, forcing Cuba to adopt a more defensive posture. In Florida, many Cubans believe that Cuba could be the next country to undergo a political transition. The island is facing increasingly severe difficulties, including frequent power outages.

Venezuela’s situation directly affects Cuba. Cuts in oil supplies, food, and other resources are exacerbating Cuba’s internal crisis and are counterproductive for the Cuban government. Social protests cannot be ruled out, and some believe these could be the final months of the Cuban regime.

Xavier Rodríguez Franco is a political scientist specialized in political analysis, international relations, Latin America comparative policies and open parliament advocacy. He hosts Mirada Semanal, a weekly podcast on current political, economic and social issues in Latin America